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INTRODUCTORY
COMMENTS
JUDGE HARLINGTON WOOD, JR.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
All of us as members of the bar appreciate last year's initial monumental
review by the Notre Dame Lawyer of the work of this court in 1975. It was
promised that the Review would be the result of "intense research, careful analysis,
and precise writing" on the part of the staff and editors, and so it proved to be.
Justice Stevens forecast in his comments that the Review would demonstrate that
"there is a substantial basis for believing that some important issues have not yet
been completely understood and therefore may require further analysis and consideration." I believe it will always be so, but that is not all bad. Seldom should
we be satisfied with what has already been accomplished, lest further development, improvement, and change be stifled. Jefferson, who understood as well
as any man the revolutionary principle that ordinary people are capable of governing themselves, wrote to a friend that "laws and institutions must go hand in
hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed,
more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the circumstances, institutions must advance."
Many are the difficult and important legal issues demanding our resolution which
we may expect to arise continually among us in our free, self-governing society.
We must work together in that common enterprise.
Assembled on this court and dedicated to accomplishing its share of that
endeavor are eight active judges and one senior judge. Even though we sometimes agreeably disagree, I have great confidence in all the members of this court,
save one: the freshman member. As to him we will just have to wait and see, and
hope. There is among them a broad balance of experience. Among other things,
four have been district court judges; one, a member of the Supreme Court of his
state; one, president of his state bar association; another, a member of his state
board of law examiners; one, the Solicitor General of the United States; and
another, the attorney general of his state. They have come here well prepared
for the task. In addition, the court from time to time, due to its very heavy case
load, has had the temporary assistance of our district judges and visiting judges
from other circuits, for which it is most grateful.
That case load for the year under review was the largest in the history of
this court, and yet 1977 is already running ahead of 1976. The cases here being
reviewed have been culled from among a record 1,236 terminations. During that
time docketings pushed upward 11% to a new high of 1,339. This ever-increasing
volume is relentlessly encroaching upon the court's time for the thoughtful and
careful attention each case deserves.
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Hopefully out of it all, as the issues are examined, some satisfaction will be
found with the court's efforts. If so, we on the court fully recognize that credit
must be given to the members of the informed bar who labor in the preparation
and presentation of their cases before us, and to our colleagues on the district
courts who first confront the issues as they preside over active legal arenas. The
district judges are continually required to render considered judgments, but
seldom are allowed the luxury of a few quiet moments for research and reflection
before making their decisions.
The court welcomes this objective, critical, and intellectual consideration of
the court's 1976 product and hopes that the Review, which has now come of age,
will continue each year so that we may be numbered among the many grateful
beneficiaries of the scholarship of the Notre Dame Lawyer.
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JUDGE PHILIP W. TONE
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
How a court goes about doing its work and the volume of work to be done
influence the quality of the finished product. It therefore occurred to me, when
I was asked to submit introductory comments for this year's Seventh Circuit
Review, that a brief description of how the court does its work and of the mix and
volume of its cases might be of interest.
The court has eight active judges, as it has had for the past decade. In addition, one senior judge and a number of visiting judges combine to make a contribution approximately equivalent to that of two active judges. The three-judge
panels that decide all cases except for a handful decided en banc are drawn by lot
for each day the court is scheduled to sit.
The court holds seven sessions each year, sitting for a total of approximately
110 days and hearing six cases orally argued each day. With rare exceptions, only
one panel sits on a given day.
Several weeks before the day a case is to be orally argued, two sets of the
briefs are distributed to each of the three judges on the panel. The Seventh Circuit
is a "hot court," which is to say that the judges read the briefs before the argument. The judge's second set of briefs is for the law clerk assigned to the cases set
for that day of argument. Typically, the judge and his law clerk will discuss the
cases after they have read the briefs.
Normally, four cases are set for the morning of an argument day, and two
for the afternoon. They are likely to vary in complexity. Arguments rarely exceed
one-half hour to a side and at least four of the cases are likely to be allotted less
time than that. Because the court has read the briefs, it is unnecessary for counsel
to state the facts or explain the issues or how they arise. Counsel, usually directed
by questions from the court, can come quickly to the essentials of the case.
After the last oral argument of the day, the three judges meet in conference
to discuss and tentatively decide the cases (except for an occasional case already
decided from the bench, which usually happens at the conclusion of the argument
for appellant'). The judges state their view initially in the inverse order of their
seniority, and then an informal discussion follows, unless the result is so clear to
all that no further discussion is necessary. After all the cases have been tentatively
voted upon, the presiding judge, i.e., the chief judge if he is a member of the
panel and in his absence the most senior judge, assigns each case for the writing
of an opinion or order.
Following the conference, the judge to whom the case has been assigned
prepares a draft of an opinion or order and circulates it to the other two judges,
each of whom may approve it outright, make suggestions for change, or write and
1 The announcement of the decision is typically accompanied by a brief oral explanation
by the presiding judge, frequently supplemented by the other judges, of the reasons for the
court's decision. A brief written order follows.
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circulate a concurring or dissenting opinion. Upon the final action of all three
judges, the decision is issued.
In the Seventh Circuit about forty percent of the cases are disposed of by
signed opinion, about fifty-five percent by unpublished order, and the rest by
published per curiam opinions. The unpublished orders include cases in which
the court has announced its decision from the bench.
Our unpublished orders, which, as noted above, represent about fifty-five
percent of our decisions in cases argued orally, may not be cited as precedents
under Circuit Rule 35, a restriction that continues to be controversial. Most
circuits follow this practice, which was recommended by the Federal Judicial
Center several years ago. The Seventh Circuit orders, unlike those of some other
circuits, contain a statement of the reasons for the decision, usually in detail
comparable to that of the traditional published opinion. Space does not permit a
discussion here of the merits or defects of the unpublished order practice, but it
should at least be pointed out that the practice conserves the time of judges,
because writing and editing an explanation for the parties takes less time than
preparation of an opinion that is to be published; that if the decision whether to
publish is made intelligently and in good faith, there is little lost in the way of
useful precedent; and that the practice spares lawyers a substantial increase in the
number of volumes of the Federal Second Reporter published annually (the annual average is now over fifteen volumes).' The problem of citability is a separate one, but it is related, for obvious reasons, to the availability of the orders to
lawyers.
Each judge is authorized two law clerks but, except for the chief judge, only
one secretary. Thus the law clerks must do their own stenographic work. That
this is false economy few would deny, but it seems not likely to change.
Working practices vary from judge to judge. I meet with the law clerk
assigned to that day's cases immediately after the conference, and report to him
the tentative vote and the court's reasoning in each case. If the disposition is to
be by signed opinion, I will prepare the first draft, and then turn it over to the law
clerk for editing and for additional citations or other matter as directed. An
unpublished order may be drafted initially either by the law clerk or by me. The
other person then edits the draft. When we are both satisfied with the draft of
the opinion or order, it is typed in final form and circulated to the other judges.'
A few words about the mix of cases may be of interest. Leaving out
original petitions, about nine percent of our cases come from administrative
agencies (one-half of these from the National Labor Relations Board) and one
percent from the Tax Court. Approximately one-half of the appeals from
2 An analysis of the Ninth Circuit's unpublished order practice is reported in J. Frank,
Remarks Before the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, 16 ABA Judges' Journal 10 (1977).
He estimates the time saving for judges is "about half" and concludes that neither "lost law"
nor "evasion of responsibility" has resulted, although, largely because of the relatively large
number of judges who sit on that court, there is occasionally diversity of results between panels,
but this occurs to some degree even with respect to published opinions.
3 Although most of the judge's work consists of reading and writing in connection with
the cases orally argued, there are additional duties. These include work on unpublished orders
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 and Circuit Rule 15 disposing of cases which are
not orally argued, ruling on numerous petitions and motions, and consideration of petitions for
rehearing en banc in cases decided by panels on which the judge did not sit.
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district courts are from the Northern District of Illinois. Northern Indiana and
Eastern Wisconsin are tied for the second place, each contributing about eleven
and one-half percent. Southern Indiana is next with nine percent. Of the appeals from the district courts, thirty percent are criminal cases, although I would
guess that not that high a proportion of the judges' time is occupied with criminal
appeals.
The Seventh Circuit has had eight judgeships since 1966. In that year the
number of filings was 403. In the year ended June 30, 1977, filings totalled
1,123. Until a few years ago, of course, all dispositions were by published opinion,
and if that practice had continued the court would be hopelessly in arrears. Some
of the additional cases are of relatively low average difficulty, but there are also
many new kinds of difficult and complex cases that were unknown to the courts
a decade ago. Each new session of Congress gives the federal courts additional
tasks. With increasing frequency, as Judge McGowan has observed,4 Congress
uses open-ended language which leaves important and difficult policy decisions for
administrative agencies and ultimately the federal courts.
The overloading of the federal courts is a serious national problem that too
few responsible persons seem to be taking seriously. In some circuits it has been
found necessary, in attempting to cope with heavy backlogs, to utilize increased
numbers of staff lawyers in disposing of cases. So far the Seventh Circuit has
been able to avoid such a step. But the time available to each judge is finite.
When the work to be done rises beyond a given level, there are only two choices:
allow a backlog to accumulate or find a way to dispose of cases more quickly. To
the extent that our court and other federal courts of appeal are respected, it is
because, as Mr. Justice Brandeis said of the justices of the Supreme Court, we do
our own work. When that ceases to be true, our society will be the poorer.
Although eventually we can hope for at least the elimination of diversity
jurisdiction, the only relief now in sight is the pending legislation to increase the
number of federal judges, which Congress has had under advisement for about
five years. The Seventh Circuit would receive one additional judge. Needed
judgeships for a number of district courts, including both of those in Indiana,
that were recommended by the Judicial Conference of the United States and
provided in the proposed legislation as adopted by the Senate seem likely to be
omitted by the House. It is to be hoped that these judgeships will be restored,
and that Congress will soon take final action to give the federal courts the longawaited additional assistance that will alleviate, though not solve, the overload
problem.
These comments cannot be properly concluded without noting that the Notre
Dame Lawyer's Seventh Circuit Review, now in its third year, has been prepared
with scholarship and industry of a high order. This annual feature has proved
the value of a periodic scholarly appraisal of a court's work.

4

C. McGowan, Congress and the Courts, 62 ABAJ. 1588 (1976).
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JUDGE WALTER J. CUMMINGS
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
With this third edition, the Notre Dame Lawyer's Seventh Circuit Review
has become a well-established law students' critique of some of our opinions.
Happily, the second edition reviewed only 20 cases instead of the 29 reviewed
in the first edition, thus allowing a further in-depth analysis in the February 1977
issue. In the first edition, three of my colleagues heralded the advent of the
Seventh Circuit Review,' whereas in the second edition, another three praised the
initial effort.2
To avoid repeating the comments prefacing the prior Seventh Circuit
Reviews, these remarks will concern some of the cases discussed in those issues in
which I participated at some stage and to some extent will be a rejoinder to the
student comments. I should perhaps add that none of us resents critical comment,
for deserved criticism betters our output and at times works changes in the law.
Cases Reviewed in First Issue
In the middle of the first Review's opening section on constitutional cases is
a discussion of the Court's initial opinion in Kimbrough v. O'Neal,' one of our
many cases involving 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The main opinion in that case held that
a prisoner does have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the taking of
his diamond ring by the defendant county sheriff and deputies. In an effort to
4
avoid a dissent, my opinion relied on our then fresh opinion in Carroll v. Sielaff,
as establishing this proposition. Judge Swygert concurred on his understanding
that simple negligence was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and then Judge
Stevens concurred on Fourth Amendment grounds while pointing out that an
ordinary common law tort claim should not be cognizable in a federal court if
there is an adequate state process to redress the wrong.
While the Seventh Circuit Review favored Judge Stevens' notion that claims
of intentional deprivation of property should be decided in the state courts rather
than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this view was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Monroe v. Pape over Justice Frankfurter's lone dissent.' In light of Monroe v.
Pape, however, Judge Swygert and I were unable to accept this view regardless
of its attractiveness.
After the publication of the first Seventh Circuit Review, Kimbrough v.
O'Neal was decided by our Court en banc.' Six members of this-Court held that
Kimbrough could recover for the taking of his ring under § 1983 if he could
prove that the defendants "intentionally or with reckless disregard" caused his
1
2
3
4
5
6

51
52
523
514
365
545

985-92.
347-53.
1057 (7th Cir. 1975).
415 (7th Cir. 1975).
167 (1961).
1059 (7th Cir. 1976) (Judge Wood did not participate).

NOTRE DAME LAW.
NOTRE DAME LAW.

F.2d
F.2d
U.S.
F.2d
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property loss. In concurring, Judge Swygert again expressed the view that
Kimbrough should be able to recover even if his loss was occasioned only by
defendants' negligence. The rest of us concluded that Paul v. Davis' precluded a
recovery for negligence under § 1983. While Justice Stevens clings to his view
in Kimbrough I that there should be no recovery under § 1983 where there is an
adequate state remedy, he recognizes that this idea has not yet been accepted by
the Supreme Court.' Consequently, the Seventh Circuit Review's endorsement of
his position is presently without other authoritative support.
In Calvin v. Conlisk,9 where an allegedly deficient police disciplinary system
was considered, this Court held that the claim was justiciable and that limited
mandatory injunctive relief was proper. Our opinion was issued without the
benefit of Rizzo v. Goode.'" After the Supreme Court decided Goode, certiorari
was granted in Calvin," and on remand we held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to proceed." The Seventh Circuit Review, using very diplomatic language,
discreetly recognized that Goode cast "considerable doubt on the validity" of
Calvin. However, the original Calvin panel can take some comfort in the Review's apparent sympathy with the dissent in Goode."
Cass Student Advertising Inc. v. National Educational Advertising Service,
Inc." had a happier outcome than Calvin. The unanimous opinion determined
that the relevant market in that private antitrust case was the service of representing college newspapers throughout the United States in the placement of national advertising. The Review correctly noted that by defining the relevant
product more narrowly than the district court we increased the likelihood of
finding monopoly power. Indeed, your prophecy was fulfilled in that very case,
for on remand, the district court found that defendant had willfully retained
monopoly power in that market and granted appropriate injunctive relief. 5
Thus our "strong concern about containing anti-competitive behavior" was
vindicated. 6
The first edition of the Seventh Circuit Review also treated the panel opinion
in Swain v. Brinegar." The student writer noted that the Swain panel, over
Judge Grant's dissent, rejected the trend of other decisions permitting the delegation of the duty of preparation of an environmental impact statement to state
officials. While your critique approved this holding and a like holding in the
Second Circuit, Congress subsequently disagreed and thus caused our full Court
to review Swain.' Because of the enactment of an amendment to the National
Environmental Policy Act in 1975, we unanimously held that the delegation of
authority by the Federal Highway Administration to the Illinois Department of
7
8
9
10
11
12

13
14
15

16
17
18

424 U.S. 693 (1976).
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 701-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (1977).
520 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1975).
423 U.S. 362 (1976).
424 U.S. 902 (1976).
534 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1976).
51 NOTRE DAME LAW. at 1110, 1116.
516 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1975).
407 F. Supp. 520 (N.D. ILl.), aff'd per curiam, 537 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1976).
51 NOTRE DAME LAW. at 1124.
517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975).
542 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Judge Wood did not participate).
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Transportation was lawful; and therefore, we had to rule on the sufficiency of
the final environmental impact statement prepared by the Department of Transportation and approved by the Federal Highway Administration. In Swain II,
four members of this Court held that an environmental impact statement was
required for the entire proposed 42-mile freeway rather than merely for the first
15-mile segment. Additionally, concurring Judge Swygert would impose stringent
requirements for the EIS. The three dissenting judges concluded that it was
proper to confine the environmental impact statement to the short segment.
Swain II was not covered in your Seventh Circuit Reviews, probably because of
its somewhat limited interest.
In Polish American Congress v. Federal Communications Commission,9 the
petitioners asked us to hold that the American Broadcasting Company had
violated the Federal Communications Commission's fairness doctrine and personal attack rule by refusing them air-time to respond to a broadcast of the Dick
Cavett Show containing Polish jokes. We held that the Federal Communications
Commission had properly determined that ABC's conclusion that the broadcast
did not involve a controversial issue of public importance was not unreasonable
or reached in bad faith, so that no relief was warranted. Like us, your expert
reviewer was sympathetic to petitioners' concern about Polish jokes but noted that
our approach was consistent with that taken by other Circuits and the Supreme
Court. While he thought we "did not adequately explain" why we found the
complaint deficient,20 the opinion did state that petitioners had not shown that the
challenged segment of the broadcast constituted a presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance and that ABC's overall approach to the
subject was unbalanced. We pointed out that petitioners nowhere defined "a
question that can serve as an issue around which an important public controversy could form." In this connection, the opinion stated that the only issues
presented by the petitioners were whether Polish Americans are inferior persons
and whether promulgating Polish jokes is desirable. As the opinion noted, petitioners, of course, did not allege that there was a controversy over whether Polish
Americans are less intelligent than other people. The only possible controversy of
public importance was whether broadcasting Polish jokes is desirable, but there
was no such showing. That is why the Court found that the broadcast of these
jokes did not constitute a presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance. Although the petitioners attempted to obtain Supreme Court review,
they were unsuccessful.21
The first review also covered Swanson v. American Consumer Industries,
Inc.,2 dealing with the right to recover attorney's fees. This phase of Swanson
reiterated an earlier ruling that plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement of
reasonable attorney's fees. Both panels followed Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite"
in holding that where a plaintiff has successfully maintained a class suit under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that benefits others in the same manner as
19 520 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
20 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. at 1172.
21 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
22 517 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1975) (this followed an earlier Swanson opinion reported in
475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973)).
23 396 U.S. 375, 389, 397 (1970).
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himself, an award of attorney's fees is justified, even though actual money recovery has not been obtained. While your reviewer criticized other decisions of
this Court imposing the requirement of a fund in order to recover attorney's fees,
concededly no such requirement was imposed in Swanson, so that at least there
the Seventh Circuit has not "unnecessarily concluded that a fund is indispensable
before recovery of attorney's fees will be allowed." 24 Any such conclusion would
seem to be foreclosed by Mills.
The supposed inconsistencies in Swanson (1975) and three other cases we
decided in 1975 can perhaps be explained by the fact that our panels do not
distribute their proposed opinions to other members of the Court, who first see
them sometime after their release.25 When litigants bring truly inconsistent
opinions to the Court's attention, the matter can be resolved by en banc review.
Cases Reviewed in Second Issue
The opening section of the second Seventh Circuit Review is devoted to our
en bane opinion in Bonner v. Coughlin,2" which, like Kimbrough, deals
with the construction of Section 1983. Your opening section constitutes an outstanding treatment of our holding that a defendant's negligent conduct is insufficient to trigger 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Bonner I the panel initially held that
the plaintiff could not recover for the loss of his trial transcript because of the
prison guards' negligence.2 ' The majority considered that there was no constitutional violation because of the availability of an adequate state remedy. Because
of Monroe v. Pape,8 Chief Judge Fairchild disagreed with this reasoning but
concurred on other grounds.29
After the rehearing en banc, I was assigned the unenviable task of writing
the opinion for six of us. Each Circuit Judge will frequently at least wish to add
to or subtract from the proposed majority en banc opinion, often considerably
delaying its release. This experience and my drafting of other en banc opinions
make it obvious to me why the United States Supreme Court Justices so routinely
express their own views in separate opinions instead of trying to achieve a common opinion.
As your student commentator noted, in Bonner 1I this Court deliberately
refused to follow Fourth and Ninth Circuit opinions holding that mere negligence
is actionable under Section 1983. Since certiorari has been granted in the Ninth
Circuit case and is pending in Bonner II, the Supreme Court will almost certainly
decide this point at its present term.2
24

51 NoaRE DAME LAW. at 1258.
25 As your closely observing commentator noted, of the three cases said to be inconsistent
with Swanson (1975), two were decided only four days afterwards. The third case, Burbank v.
Twomey, 520 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1975), was decided two months after Swanson (1975) and
chose to rely upon it. See 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. at 1253, 1255.
26 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (Judge Wood did not participate).
27 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975).

28

365 U.S. 167 (1961).

29 517 F.2d at 1321.
30 Certiorari was granted in Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1976), 429
U.S. 1060 (1977), while certiorari is still pending in Bonner. See 430 U.S. 651, 657 n.ll.
The Bonner panel and en bano opinions were cited in the majority and dissenting opinions in
Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977), but the Court has not yet indicated whether it
feels that recovery should be permitted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in cases of negligence.
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In Bonner II, the en banc opinion took its cue from Paul v. Davie' that the
Supreme Court does not want to provide federal fora for § 1983 claims which
are also ordinary state torts. Even the three dissenting Justices in Paul went no
further than Bonner 11 in concluding that "intentional conduct" infringing a
person's liberty or property interests without due process of law is within the
ambit of § 1983." 2
Although your commentator seemed to prefer Judge Swygert's dissenting
view that § 1983 does reach claims based on negligence, he agreed with the en
banc opinion that "extension of § 1983 to cases of negligent deprivations of constitutional rights may not be justified by congressional intent."33 It will be
interesting to see whether the Supreme Court adheres to Paul v. Davis. If the
Court should unexpectedly follow the Ninth Circuit's lead in Navarette34
and Judge Swygert's dissent in Bonner II, the federal district courts will
be further inundated despite already burgeoning civil rights dockets.
Since I was on the panel that produced both opinions in Evans v. United
Air Lines, Inc.,3" I thought it might be useful to discuss that case even though
the opinions were written by a visiting Circuit Judge. The panel first held, as
your commentator observed, that the statutory filing time for United's 1968
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (through its rule against the employment
of married stewardesses) had elapsed 90 days after Mrs. Evans' employment was
terminated. The panel granted a rehearing of its first opinion because of the
Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Company, Inc.36 On rehearing, the panel held that Mrs. Evans' theory of a
continuing violation was valid, so that the judicial requirements of Title VII had
been met. Your two commentators were fair enough to say: "The Evans [II]
decision reflects an underlying theme of the Supreme Court in Franks. .. 23
However, the Seventh Circuit Review criticized Evans II for permitting
suits to be filed during the operation of an otherwise nondiscriminatory company
policy, even if the policy is deemed to perpetuate the effects of a prior discriminatory act. 8 In this respect, your organ was much more prophetic than the
Evans panel, for the Supreme Court reversed us,39 holding that its decision in
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company was not controlling. The only
comfort to the Seventh Circuit panel is that two dissenting Justices agreed that
since United treated Mrs. Evans as a new employee on her rehire, even though
she had been wrongfully forced to resign, its violation was "continuing to this
day" so that her charge was not time-barred."

31 424 U.S. at 693.
32 424 U.S. at 720.
33 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. at 363. S.ee also 545 F.2d at 568.
34 See note 30 supra.
1976). Our second opinion is reproduced in 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976). Rehearing en
banc was denied on June 7, 1976.
35 Our first opinion appears in 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 10,665 (7th Cir., Jan. 29,
36 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
37 52 NoTRE DAME LAW. at 377.
38 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. at 377.
39 45 U.S. L.W. 4566 (U.S. May 31, 1977) (No. 76-333).
40 Id. at 4568.
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Conclusion
As a subordinate court, we cannot decide cases contrary to Supreme Court
precedents that still appear viable, even though your Review and we might prefer
a different approach. However, we can and do overrule our own decisions that
do not withstand the passage of time or such analysis as evidenced in the Seventh
Circuit Reviews. Also, as you have noted, we refuse to follow conflicting decisions of our sister circuits if convinced that a different outcome is warranted.
In such instances, when forthcoming, your and Supreme Court approval are indeed heartening. In future issues, continue to disagree with us whenever warranted, for your criticism will not fall on deaf ears.

